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MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs-ZoNING-AMoRTIZATION oF Ex!sTING NoNUsEs-ln 1930 defendant Gage acquired several lots in the City of

CONFORMING

Los Angeles. He constructed a residential building in which he established a
wholesale and retail plumbing business, using one room as an office for the
conduct of his business. Also used in the business were a garage and racks, bins,
and stalls for the storage of materials and supplies. The use to which defendant
put the property was permitted under the applicable zoning ordinance of 1930.
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Later the ordinance was changed so as to make defendant's use of both lots
nonconforming. In 1946 another rezoning ordinance provided that the nonconforming commercial use of a residential building and the nonconforming
use of land where no buildings were employed in connection with such use
should be discontinued within five years. Five years having elapsed, plaintiff
brought suit for an injunction ordering defendant to discontinue the prohibited
use of his property. The lower court refused an injunction on the ground that
to order defendant to abandon a twenty-year-old user would be a deprivation
of property without due process of law. On appeal, held, reversed. The requirement that an existing nonconforming use be discontinued within five
years from the date of passage of the zoning ordinance is a constitutional
exercise of the police power. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, (Cal. App. 1954)

274 P. (2d) 34.
Nonconforming uses1 existing at the time a zoning ordinance goes into effect
are carefully protected.2 There are, however, various techniques employed to
secure the gradual elimination of these uses, and in general they are constitutional. Discontinuance of a nonconforming use may constitute abandonment
and its resumption may be prohibited.3 Changes and extensions of use may be
prohibited with a view toward gradual natural elimination.4 The power of eminent domain might also be employed to remove certain uses. 5 Although these
methods were at one time considered an adequate solution to the problem of
eliminating nonconforming uses, it is now apparent that they are not. There
is little hope that such uses will disappear by themselves where the nonconforming use enjoys a monopolistic advantage, protected from further invasion by the
zoning ordinance.6 As a more efficient device to insure the eventual conformity
of a zone, a number of states and municipalities have adopted a plan of amortization. 7 This is a plan whereby the nonconforming use must be discontinued
1 For a discussion of what constitutes a nonconforming use and the proof thereof, see
8 McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRAnoNs §25.185 et seq. (1950). See also 102 Umv. PA.
L. REv. 91 at 94 (1953).
2 To the effect that a zoning ordinance cannot prohibit existing lawful nonconforming
uses, see Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W. (2d) 960 (1932);
Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930); 86 A.L.R. 648 (1933). Nonconforming uses are also often protected by special statutory provisions. 1951 Wxs. L. REv.
685 at 688.
3 Where a nonconforming use has been abandoned, all further use of land or buildings
must be in conformity with the zoning ordinance. State ex rel. Turner v. Baumhauer, 234
Ala. 286, 174 S. 514 (1937); Beszedes v. Board of Commrs. of Arapahoe County, 116
Colo. 123, 178 P. (2d) 950 (1947). See 18 A.L.R. (2d) 725 (1951).
4 For two theories as to what limitations may be placed on existing uses, compare In
re Gillillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 A. 136 (1927) with Ballercia v. Quinn, 320 Mass.
687, 71 N.E. (2d) 235 (1947).
5 See Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §125.583(a); State ex rel. Twin City B. & I. Co.
v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1919). Cf. Riverbank Improvement Co. v.
Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N.E. 244 (1917).
6 See 1951 Wxs. L. REv. 685. See also Bettman, "A Backward Step in Zoning," 16
Jotm. LANI> AND PUllLIC UnLITY EcoN. 455 (1940).
1 See, e.g., Colo. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) c. 45A, §19 (county zoning); ill. Rev.
Stat. (1953) c. 24, §73-1 (city zoning); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §19-2919 (county
zoning); Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 19, c. 19, §862.16 (county zoning); Pa. Stat.

764

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

within a prescribed time. Whether this delayed definite prohibition of an existing nonconforming use constitutes a talcing of property without due process of
law has not often come before the courts. In two cases8 the Louisiana Supreme
Court has upheld a one year amortization period as applied to a grocery store
and a drug store, but the reasoning was confused by the court's views on the
law of nuisance. While it is recognized that a legislature may extend the common law nuisance doctrine, 9 to expand it to include such hannless enterprises
as grocery stores and drug stores seems arbitrary.10 More recently, amortization
of a filling station was upheld on the ground that it was a reasonable exercise
of the state police power,11 but the court relied on authority upholding statutory expansions of nuisance where the power of the state is conceded to be
absolute. 12 The question remains whether the state has the power to require
elimination of uses which are not within the permissible expansion of the law
of nuisance, but are within the state's power to prohibit in the future under the
"zoning power." To require immediate elimination of such a use would be
invalid.13 An amortization of such use within a "reasonable" time has been held
to be invalid. 14 An amortization of such use within a "fixed" period of time is
upheld in the principal case, the theory being that elimination of nonconforming
uses by this particular method is as valid an exercise of police power as elimination by way of discontinuance or limitations on expansion, alteration, and
repairs. 15 Thus the principal case provides a better rationale for sustaining
amortization of existing uses than any of the earlier cases. The court squarely

Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1954) tit. 16, §510.14 (county zoning); Utah Code Ann. (1943)
§19-24-18 (county zoning); Va. Code (1950) §15-843 (city zoning). Cities with amortization plans (cited in principal case at 41): Los Angeles Mun. Code, §12.123 B&C (1946);
Chicago Zoning Ord. §20 (1944); Richmond, Va., Zoning Ord., Art. XIlI, §1 (1948);
Wichita, Kan., Zoning Ord. §24 (1948).
s State ex rel. Detna Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 S. 613 (1929), cert.
den. 280 U.S. 556; State ex rel. Detna Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 S. 314
(1929).
9 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915) (elimination of a brick
kiln); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246 (1928) (elimination of diseasecarrying trees). In most of the cases in which legislation of this kind has been sustained,
the use prohibited has been one of a type causing some tangible harm such as soot, odors,
or noise. See 41 CoL. L. REv. 457 at 464 (1941).
10 For criticisms of the Louisiana decisions see O'Reilly, "The Nonconforming Use and
Due Process of Law," 23 G:i;o. L.J. 218 at 226 (1935); 39 YAL:i; L.J. 735 at 737 (1930).
11 Standard Oil Co. v. Talahassee, (5th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 410.
12 In Standard Oil Co. v. Talahassee, note 11 supra, the court relied principally on
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, note 9 supra. Whether the court was correct in allowing the
elimination of a filling station as a reasonable exercise of the police power because of its
proximity to the state capital and a school is questionable. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling
Green, note 2 supra, where it was held that it was not within the state's police power to
require the elimination of a filling station located in a residential neighborhood.
13 Jones v. Los Angeles, note 2 supra.
14Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E. (2d) 697 (1953), noted in 67
HAn.v. L. REv. 1283 (1954).
15 Principal case at 44. The constitutionality of other techniques used to eliminate
nonconforming uses is discussed in 147 A.L.R. 167 (1943).
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faced the question whether amortization was a reasonable exercise of the police
power and decided that under these circumstances it was. 16
Existing nonconforming uses present a serious problem to city planners.17 To
meet the problem it is necessary to use a device which adequately protects
private property, 18 does not unduly discourage future investment, and minimizes
economic waste.19 On the other hand, the device must be effective enough that
the eventual elimination of the nonconforming use will be assured. A proper
scheme of amortization, designed to take into account this conllict of interests,
is the best solution yet proposed.
James W. Beatty, S.Ed.

1 6 The cost of moving was found to be less than one percent of the minimum gross
income for the live years.
17 Oppermann, "Non-Conforming Use and the City Plan," 15 Joun. l.AND AND POBuc
UTILITY EcoN. 94 (1939); Bartholomew, ''Non-Conforming Uses Destroy the Neighborhood," id. at 96.
18 Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447 (1928). See 30 YALB L.J. 735
at 739 (1930).
10 102 Umv. PA. L. REv. 91 (1953).

